



Clearing a recent building – a chance to get as much material out as indistinguishable from background

A rare opportunity

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Winfrith EAST building

- Built to treat 300 m³ of sludge from the SGHWR
- Correctly, the Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor
- Britain's take on the Candu
- Very high maintenance, very high operator doses



A relatively new building

- **Built 2001 to process radioactive sludges from existing concrete storage tanks**
- **The sludges were agitated, filtered and concentrated prior to encapsulation in a cement matrix within 500 litre stainless steel drums.**
- **Only a very small number of minor incidents inside the cell line**
- **Finished sludge encapsulation in April 2010**
- **Much considered to be “clean”**



Active areas and components

- **Input piping**
- **Mixing tanks**
- **Dirty side ventilation**
- **Some equipment transferred from other buildings**
- **Removed as far as possible early in the project**
- **- reducing the chance of cross-contamination and background increase**



Clean – the UK’s working definition

- Clean can only be by history
- = no reasonable chance of contamination or activation
- It is not possible to declare clean by monitoring only
- See the CEWG NICoP
- <http://www.cewg.co.uk/library-2/20-click-here-to-download-the-latest-version-of-the-nicop.html>
- “Clean” checked by monitoring
- If anything is active, then there has been a failure in understanding



Clearance and Radiological Sentencing:
Principles, Processes and Practices
for Use by the Nuclear Industry


A Nuclear Industry Code of Practice



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This Draft Update of the Nuclear Industry Code of Practice on Clearance and Exemption Principles, Processes and Practices is published on behalf of the Nuclear Industry Safety Directors Forum.

Aim – to demonstrate that the material is indistinguishable from background

- **Conventional monitoring involves a ratemeter based measurement and the user's judgement**
 - **Background or not background?**
 - **Difficult to quantify**
 - **Difficult to audit**
 - **Poor sensitivity**
- 
- **This project uses integrated counts over a defined area**
 - **Easy to calculate statistical uncertainty**

Point of suspicion

- **Growing in popularity as an idea in the UK**
- **Numerically the same as Currie Critical Limit**
- **But easier language**
- **“Do we think this might well not be background?”**
- **Prompts an action – remeasure and average**
- **This project the point of suspicion is set at the mean + 2 sigma**
- **Expect 1 measurement in 40 will exceed**

Maximum missable activity - MMA

- Numerically the same as Currie Limit of Detection
- Looked at from the right direction – below upwards not top downwards
- “Are we confident we’re not above some limit?”
- Means we don’t collect particles less than the LoD, which confuses project managers
- Approximated to the activity which would give background + 4 sigma on average with Point of Suspicion at mean + 2 sigma

Currie – the man who brought sense to this sort of measurement

- **Limits for qualitative detection and quantitative determination. Application to radiochemistry**
- **Lloyd A. Currie**
- ***Anal. Chem.*, 1968, 40 (3), pp 586–593**
- **DOI: 10.1021/ac60259a007**
- **Publication Date: March 1968**

Approach


- **Identify a fingerprint**
- **Choose an instrument and detector**
- **Work out the response to the fingerprint**
- **Identify clean reference samples for each object category**
- **Identify a low background area**
- **Perform a 100 second count**
- **This becomes the reference for that sort of object and the next 2 hours**
- **Look up the Point of Suspicion on a spreadsheet**
- **Any measurement that equals or exceeds that, repeat and average**
- **If still above the Point of Suspicion, deem it contaminated**

Fingerprint

- A mixture of activation products and fuel leakage
- Modified by the pond water treatment process
- Established by measurement of the sludge
- Only 0.06 % alphas
- 11 % Ni-63 – very difficult to detect beta
- 60 % Cs-137- medium energy beta
- 22 % Co-60 – low energy beta
- 4 % Fe-55 – low energy X-ray
- 3 % minor contributions
- **The Cs-137 is easy to detect**

Instruments used

- **Larger, flat areas – Thermo DP6 dual phosphor scintillator**
 - Convenient area – 100 cm²
 - Good alpha and medium to high energy beta efficiency
 - About 40 % for alpha and 50 % for beta, 2 π
- **More complicated areas- Thermo BP4 scintillator or HP210 GM**
 - Similar efficiencies but only about 20 cm² area
- **Connected to an Electra ratemeter – dual channel, selectable beta channel width and integrating time**
- **RSRL standard instruments**



Performance of the DP6 for direct measurement

- Averaged over the probe area
- DP6 alpha 20 cps/Bq/cm²
- DP6 beta fingerprint 12 cps/Bq/cm²
- Maximum acceptable beta background = 6 cps
- For a 30 second count, background mean = 180 counts
- 1 sigma (σ) = $\sqrt{180} = 13.4$ counts = 0.45 cps
- MMA corresponds to $\approx 4 \sigma = 1.8$ cps
- Corresponding fingerprint activity = 0.15 Bq/cm²
- For all barring thin material, this would meet the then SoLA Exemption Limit of 0.4 Bq/g

HP260 based direct measurement

- **HP260 beta fingerprint 2.6 cps/Bq/cm²**
- **Maximum acceptable background = 1 cps**
- **For a 30 second count, background mean = 30 counts**
- **1 sigma (σ) = $\sqrt{30} = 5.5$ counts = 0.18cps**
- **MMA corresponds to $\approx 4 \sigma = 0.7$ cps**
- **Corresponding fingerprint activity = 0.28 Bq/cm²**

Measurement by wipe

- Useful for smooth complicated surfaces to assess removable activity
- 10 % pick-up factor assumed!
- Probably conservative in this case
- Review gave values mostly in the 10 to 30 % range
- MMAs were about 0.24 Bq/cm² for a 300 cm wipe and 0.08 Bq/cm² for a 1000 cm² wipe



Surveyors reaction

- **Surveyors initially resisted the approach**
- **They didn't like the idea of integrating over significant areas having spent their careers surveying small areas by ear**
- **“But what if all the activity is in one spot”**
- **Good question – if it is, then ALARP suggests we remove it**
- **So keep listening – if there seems to be an unusual count rate, check it's real**
- **If not, just start again!**

Operations for objects

- **Each object had a unique reference number**
- **Description recorded – material, form etc**
- **Measured and weighed**
- **Select a suitable background object**
- **Measure the background over 100 seconds**
- **Look up the corresponding point of suspicion on a spreadsheet**
- **Divide the object surface into convenient areas, up to about 0.5 m² for large, flat things**
- **Make the measurement**
- **Record the result**
- **If it complies, into the acceptable pile for disposal as exempt waste**

Operations for buildings

- **Basically the same approach**
- **Identify areas likely to be clean – no history of spills etc**
- **Check the count rate is basically the same over the walls**
- **Check it's the same over the floors**
- **Check it's the same over the steel doors**
- **The major confounding factor were the door apertures**
- **Rooms with small door area had higher backgrounds**
- **K-40 in the building material, checked with an Exploranium GR-135**

Result

- **All the material expected to be clean complied with the criteria**
- **Not as expensive as some people imagined**
- **Possible improvement would be to use a beta detector with a thinner scintillator.**
- **This reduces the background and, hence, the monitoring time for a given MMA**
- **Now we'd work to EPR, which uses nuclide specific Out of Scope Levels**
- **This procedure would still be sufficient**

Acknowledgement

- **Michelle Skelland, RSRL, the lady who turned the theory into a result**